This paper establishes a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain composed of a manufacturer, a retailer and an e-tailer. Based on the heterogeneity degree of consumers' preferences for remanufactured products, we then built an independent pricing model for the first cycle and a joint pricing model for second cycle and studied the mutual restriction of the product prices of retailers and e-tailers and the influence of consumers' preferences on manufacturer wholesale prices under the condition of market competition. In addition, we also studied consumers' preferences for products in the second cycle of the supply chain members' products to determine optimal pricing and profitability. The results show that the product prices of the retailer and e-tailer have restrictions and are promoted. Consumers' preferences for remanufactured products were positively correlated with supply chain members' and manufacturers' profit growth significantly more than with that of retailers and e-tailers. When consumer demand reaches a certain level, the total profits of retailers are higher due to participation in remanufacturing. We conclude with a numerical example analysis and management advice.
INTRODUCTION
In the 21st century, the rapid development of economies and societies has intensified environmental, climate and other issues, while resource constraints and other social problems are becoming more significant. Remanufacturing is a new production mode and is one of four types of circular economy modes: reduce, reuse, recycle, and remanufacture. Remanufacturing is also an important part of modern advanced manufacturing technology and has become a hot issue in industry and academic research around the world. Green manufacturing and the recycling economy are the foundation of the sustainable development of human society and the direction of future development in the manufacturing sector. Therefore, remanufacturing has significant potential benefits for emerging industries.
For example, remanufacturing in Europe and the United States has developed into a huge industry. In 2005, global manufacturing output was more than $100 billion, and the U.S. remanufacturing industry annual output value reached $75 billion, equivalent to the computer manufacturing output of the U.S. in the same year. According to the national report of <remanufacturing industry development>, every 1 kg of new materials used to remanufacture can save 5-9 kg of raw materials. Worldwide, remanufacturing saves approximately 14 million tons of material each year, enough to load 230,000 train cars. Remanufactured product energy consumption was only approximately 15% that of new products. Around the world, remanufacturing can save 16 million barrels of oil per year, equivalent to 6 million vehicles' gasoline for a year. Remanufacturing in China is also rapidly developing, especially in aspects such as industrial practice and basic research. Though the public media rarely promotes remanufactured products, such products are still familiar to consumers. Liu et al., (2009) explored consumer awareness of product remanufacturing and performed a purchase behavior analysis, showing that a consumer's age, family income and living standard are negatively related to the consumer's purchase intention. Education and purchase experience are positively related with purchase intention. In addition, the prices of remanufactured products and the same type of new products are the main factors affecting consumer purchase behavior. Therefore, in this paper, we consider the degree of heterogeneity in consumer remanufactured product preferences to analyze the optimal pricing. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section is devoted to the model conceptualization and formulation. Optimal price strategies for the CLSC supply channel members are developed in Section 3. Section 4 gives a numerical simulation and explores the impact of λon the optimal profit of retailers, e-tailers and manufacturers. Finally, conclusions are provided in the last section.
LETERATURE REVIEW
At present, domestic and foreign scholars involved in remanufacturing research mainly focus on the sale of recovered products and on using game theory to study product pricing in the process of remanufacturing. Domestic scholars tend to study remanufacturing from the perspective of the consumer and the manufacturer. For example, Bao et al studied the optimal pricing strategy of used products. Bao indicated that as the customer retention price difference increases, the price changes based on demand become more significant. Independent remanufacturers, therefore, in the case of unclear customer reservation prices, should set higher prices, then adjust the price according to the actual situation (Bao et al., 2008) . Chen et al., (2008) studied double channel retailers' pricing strategy in the Internet environment using game model analysis. They found that with the popularization and spread of e-commerce, and with all other conditions unchanged, the double channel profits of retailers will continue to increase. The product pricing strategy is directly related to the manufacturer's profit and operating efficiency. Guo et al., (2013) analyzed remanufactured product joint pricing decisions under uncertain demand with numerical simulation, considering the difference between new products and remanufactured products and studying the effect of product pricing and profit yield to manufacturers. Ji (2015) researched the optimal decision problem in the case of remanufactured products faced with competition when manufacturers are risk averse. Xu et al., (2008) built on the two-cycle remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain decision-making model in the case of a decentralized decision or centralized decision and found the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price and repurchase price and analyzed the effect of changes in different parameters on price, recovery rate and profits. Gao et al., (2014) set up different pricing models for a static decision, obtained the corresponding optimal pricing strategy, and analyzed the remanufactured products and refurbished products' run effect on the new products market.
Foreign scholars tend to study remanufacturing from the perspectives of channel management, government subsidies and product recovery rates. Liu et al., (2015) studied the model of price competition, taking into account the quality of recycled second-hand electronic products and government subsidies to provide an optimal pricing strategy. Huang et al., (2013) based on the strategy of dual-channel closed-loop supply chain recycling research, discussed the manufacturer's optimal profit. Yi et al., (2016) focused on retailers throughout the life of the closed-loop supply chain network optimization design of remanufacturing engineering machinery terminals and successfully applied the improved hybrid genetic algorithm to optimizing the structure of closed-loop supply chain networks. Garg et al., (2015) studied an efficient recovery system for manufacturers to promote existing supply chains and formed a unique and efficient "low-carbon logistics" closed-loop supply chain. Wang et al., (2014) studied how to use the dynamic system method to optimize product recycling and the effect of government subsidies on product remanufacturing. Gan et al., (2015) studied manufacturers as Stackelberg leaders that coordinate pricing strategy and showed that the product demand rate of the change of price stability and the influence of the supply chain profit have a significant impact. He (2015) carried out a detailed study on the procurement price of second-hand products and remanufacturing strategies under the condition of the closed-loop supply chains and analyzed the different modes of the optimal purchasing price and the best remanufacturing strategy. Abbey et al., (2015) studied the optimal pricing of new products and remanufacturing products, showing that the optimal pricing of new products would increase when the products entered the market again.
The above literature mainly researched the influence of supply chain members' risk preferences, recycling processing costs, product quality levels, and product demand rate of change on remanufacturing pricing strategy. However, few researchers consider consumers' preferences for remanufactured products, and there is almost no research on optimal product pricing, which combines heterogeneous consumers in two cycles (new product sales and remanufacturing product sales) in a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain. At the National People's Congress and the Chinese Political Consultative Conference (NPC&CPPCC) held in 2015, Prime Minister Li Keqiang repeatedly mentioned "Internet +", emphasizing that the remanufacturing industry must rely on electronic commerce for sustainable development. In this paper, we consider the heterogeneity in consumers' degree of preference for new products and remanufactured products, combining this with the background of "Internet +" and using a two-cycle dual-channel model to study differential pricing strategies for products.
MODEL ASSUMPTIONS AND NOTATIONS
The goal of this paper is to develop an understanding of the influence of  (degree of consumers' preferences for remanufacturing products) on the profits of supply chain members.
In the rest of the paper, the following parameters and variables defined in Tab.1 are used.
Tabla 1 Definition of parameters and variables

Problem description
As shown in Fig.1 , the two cycles are remanufacturing dual channels with a closed-loop supply chain. In the first cycle, retailers obtain wholesale new products from manufacturers with the wholesale price w 1 , retailers resell them to consumers with the price p 1r , and e-tailers resell them to consumers with the price p 1e . This assumes that the retailers recycle second-hand products from the consumers at the end of the product life cycle. In the second cycle, retailers recycle second-hand products with the price A, and retailers resell them to manufacturers with the price b r , so that b r > A. Manufacturers manufacture the new product and remanufacture the second-hand product at the same time, and the per unit cost is c m and c r for new and used products, respectively. Here, c m >c r . Figure 1 . The decision structure of two-cycle dual-channel closed-loop supply chain.
Model assumptions
To more clearly explicate the model, this paper makes several corresponding assumptions as follows: Assumption 1. Assume that independent manufacturers recycle waste products under the pressure of regulations and out of concern for the environment and remanufacture these products to net profit and reduce costs. The recovery rate is ,(0<<1).  reflects the size of the remanufacturing resource constraints and is the fundamental features of manufacturing systems, different from general systems.
Assumption 2. w is the wholesale price of remanufactured products, and the parameter  is the wholesale price discount coefficient, (0,1]. It changes with the products' quality, safety coefficient and the bargaining power between the manufacturer and retailers, as well as other factors.
Assumption 3. In this paper,  shows the degree of consumers' preferences for remanufacturing products, namely, consumers' acceptance of remanufactured products compared to the new product, (0,1). Because consumers' willingness to pay is heterogeneous, assuming the sale price of new products is p, the sale price of remanufactured products is p.
Assumption 4. Information is completely symmetrical. Assumption 5. While optimizing their objective functions, all closed-loop supply chain members have access to the same information. The manufacturer has sufficient channel power over the retailer and the e-tailer to act as a Stackelberg leader (Ma, 2013) .
Assumption 6. The product can be recycled and manufactured only once, such as with computers, cell phones, etc. Consumers can only buy one unit of a new product or products.
Assumption 7. We only consider traditional retailers recycling old products and the investment in product collection activities, where I=B 2 and B is the scaling parameter, which is similar to the input and output of advertising (Ma, 2015) . Assumption 8. Following previous studies and considering that price is a major factor in product demand in developing countries, we set up the product demands q r and q e using the equations below. 
Here, r p and e p are the product prices for retailers and e-tailers. Q 0 is product demand when product prices are equal to 0. a is a recycler's self-price sensitivity to product demand, and b is cross-price sensitivity to product demand. This type of demand function is widely used in the literature (Tsay et al., 2000; Yao et al., 2005; Mukhopadhyay et al., 2008; Yuan et al., 2014) . While we consider the competition between retailers and e-tailers in the market, their price is a more significant influence on their own needs, therefore, a>b.
MODEL FORMULATION AND SOLUTION
Only new products of the independent pricing model
In the first cycle, manufacturers only produce new products. The manufacturer, the retailer, and the e-tailer are all independent decision makers. Each of them aims to maximize their own profit. Based on the above problem formulation and the assumptions in Section 2, the profits of the manufacturer, the retailer and the e-tailer in the first cycle are given as follows:
   
Because we assume that the Stackelberg game occurs between the manufacturer and the other agents, with the manufacturer behaving as the Stackelberg leader and dominating the supply chain system, the other agents (the retailer and the e-tailer) are followers.
In addition, a non-cooperative game occurs between the retailer and the e-tailer. Hence, manufacturers determine the wholesale price w 1 first, then retailers and e-tailers determine the selling price according to the manufacturer's decision. By the backward induction method, we achieve the results below. 
Optimal new product prices, equilibrium new product sales, and channel profits can easily be found by the substitution of w  .
According to the above results, the following propositions can be made: Proposition 1. For only the new products from the independent pricing model, the optimal wholesale price of new product w 1  decreases with increasing values of a, which means that the retailer's product price has a more significant effect on market demand, and the optimal wholesale price w 1  of new products is smaller. The optimal wholesale price of new product w 1  increases with increasing values of b, which means that the e-tailer's product price has a more significant effect on market demand, and the optimal wholesale price w 1  of new products is greater.
Proof. Calculating the first-order derivative of w 1  for a and b can produce the above conclusion.
Proposition 2. For only the new products of the independent pricing model, the retailer's optimal price * 1r
p increases with b. The more significant the effect of the e-tailer's product selling price on market demand, the higher the retailer's optimal pricing is. The e-tailer's optimal price * 1e
p decreases with increases of a. The more significant the effect of a retailer's product selling price on market demand, the lower the e-tailer's optimal pricing is.
Proof. Calculating the first-order derivative of p 1r  for b and p 1e  for a, can produce the above conclusion.
New products and remanufactured products joint pricing model
In the second cycle, the retailer recycles second-hand products, and manufacturers produce remanufactured products and new products at the same time. Assuming S remanufactured products were sold with the unit price p 2r through the retailer, where (0,1), (1-)S remanufactured products were sold with the unit pricep 2e
through the e-tailer, we consider the heterogeneity of consumers.
Profits of the retailer in the second cycle:
Profits of the e-tailer in the second cycle: 
Profits of the manufacturer in the second cycle: 
Similar to the first cycle, because the manufacturer is a Stackelberg leader, manufacturers determine the wholesale price w 2 and transfer price b r first, then retailers and e-tailers determine selling price according to the manufacturer's decision. By the backward induction method, we achieve the results below.
Concavity plays a key role in the deduction of optimal strategies. For this reason, we first prove the concavity of  2r and  2e .
The retailer`s problem: Taking the derivative of  2r with respect to p 2r yields From type (6) and type (7), we obtain 
Substituting p 2r and p 2e into the profit function of the manufacturer, we achieve  2m as follows: 0  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
which means that  2m is a monotonic decreasing function of b r . The optimal transfer price is obviously equal to its lower bound of A, i.e., 
Substituting type (11) into type (8), we can obtain the manufacturer's optimal profit:
Proposition 3. In the new products and remanufactured products joint pricing model, the wholesale price of new products increases as consumers' preference for remanufactured products increases. The stronger the consumer's willingness to pay (WTP) for remanufactured products, the higher the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price.
Proof. Calculating the first-order derivative of w * 2 for  produces the above conclusion. 
, the selling price of e-tailers increases as consumers' preference for remanufactured product increases. The stronger the consumer's willingness to pay for remanufactured products, the higher the e-tailer's optimal selling price is when
The selling price of e-tailers decreases as consumers' preference for remanufactured products increases. The stronger the consumer's willingness to pay for remanufactured products, the lower the e-tailer's optimal selling price is.
Proof. Calculating the first-order derivative of p * 2e for  produces the above conclusion.
NUMERICAL SIMULATION
To have a better understanding of the influence of consumers' preferences for remanufactured products on the profits of supply chain members, a numerical simulation analysis was carried out in the following section.
The influence of  on the profits of supply chain members
Because there is no remanufacturing in the first cycle, to facilitate analysis, we only take into account the profit function of supply chain members in the second cycle. The fixed parameters are: As shown in Fig2, the profits of manufacturers, retailers and e-tailers increase as consumer preferences for remanufactured products increase. This is because the more consumers there are for remanufactured products, the higher the consumer surplus is, and the market demand will increase accordingly. The market demand increase will stimulate production, which obviously makes the profits for the members of the supply chain increase. The higher degree of consumer preferences for remanufactured products will, in turn, stimulate the retailer to recycle used products, promoting the recycling economy, reducing production costs, and increasing the supply chain profit.
According to Fig2, we can also see that the manufacturer's profit function growth rate is significantly higher than the retailer's and e-tailer's. This is because there is only one manufacturer who acts as the channel leader without competition. The retailer and e-tailer will seize market shares, which restrict each other. The manufacturer will also save a part of the cost of production because of remanufacturing and thereby increase its profit. By the same token, the retailer's profit function is slightly higher than that of the e-tailer's profit function, which is also because of participation in recycling used products. With the continuous increase of  , the final retailer's profit is higher.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, based on a two-cycle dual-channel closed-loop supply chain, we established a remanufactured product pricing model that takes into account the heterogeneity of different consumer groups' preferences for remanufactured products. We also studied the optimal pricing and the optimal profit of supply chain members. Under the condition of a series of hypotheses, we carried out a theoretical analysis and a case analysis. Our results show that in the first cycle, the retailer and e-tailer have the optimal pricing, and the retailer's selling price has a less significant impact on the market demand, while the e-tailer's selling price has a more significant impact on the market demand the higher the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price is.
Manufacturers implement product remanufacturing and differential pricing strategies in the second cycle. First, as consumer preferences for remanufactured products increase, the supply chain members' profit function keeps increasing, and the growth rate of the manufacturer's profit function is higher than that of the retailer and e-tailer. Second, with an increase in , consumer surplus and market demand keep increasing. The retailer's profit is greater than the e-tailer's profit, as  increases to a certain point and continues to increase. Finally, the retailer profit function growth rate is greater than the e-tailer's, primarily because the retailer participated in recycling used products and promoted sustainable development, which shows that remanufacturing can also bring profit growth.
For different types of remanufactured products, consumer preferences will also differ. We conducted a general study in this paper and did not consider the influence of different products. Future research should examine consumers' preferences for different types of remanufactured products in an in-depth study.
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